There is always, with us, the element of imperfection, and there has always been. Accordingly, if "meaning" is taken to be a representation of reality, then both meaning and reality escape us, and have always done so.
If meaning is of an extent of substance, then it is truthful to that extent. If a contention of truth is of substance, then it corresponds to reality to that extent. This final consummation of the thought-train is valueless--it is of no moral import that something is true, for no element of consideration would exist between something being in fact and that same thing being appreciated as factual by some postulated observer.
Only the consideration of some observer, some appreciator, as being imperfect makes the notions of truth or meaning of moral import, since the qualities of morality or immorality hinge upon the relative attentions or efforts of the observer-appreciator. We always gather our attentions too late, and we always flag in the application of our efforts, and we have always done so as a species--or else we have possessed some one or another quality of being "like us" (the divine majesty overlooking Creation) that makes mock of the idea of what it is to be a created thing distinct from the Maker.
We can say that we do something "naturally" or without artifice, but that is intrinsically untrue. An athlete striving to complete some task will always be a split-second behind any stimulus of the developing task, and an athlete attempting to devote full efforts will always fall some perhaps immeasurable degree short of that determination--to say nothing of being able to sustain a full measure of that determination. A pristine Adam leaping automatically or guilelessly to do the will of his Father would put us to shame by comparison, but we would shame ourselves exponentially if we proclaimed in false modesty that such an imagined paragon of creaturely virtue makes us look bad by comparison, if in that very exclamation we were assigning to our forebear not the relative godliness of a near-perfect state, but rather an untrammeled stake in godhood itself.
Adam was never perfect, and he never grasped his existence perfectly. Adam felt (to use the two common concepts abroad in the Western World conceit-trap into which the Genesis-anchored belief skein subsided so many irretrievable centuries ago) shame and guilt. We usually say "guilt and shame," and the apparent logical primacy we accord to "being guilty" of something before "feeling shame" for it is perhaps reflected in that word-order preference, but we have no warrant for such an assumption about human existence overall. As I have written, humanity's decline from the easily-said "innocence" of newborn "little ones" (a notion of limited utility, since we cannot know when that innocent state ends) is a decline best understood in terms of shame-inducing reproof to the child before there can be any guilt-inducing explanation offered the child.
So also goes the story of the first couple, whose described guilt of the fruit-eating trespass (an awkwardly step-wise progression to a conventionally-described moment of instantaneous sinfulness) is preceded by the assertion either that in their nakedness before each other they felt no shame, or that they were not shamed. The distinction between the two shame-conceits is immaterial, since--as with the conceptualized child--any time-regression analysis leads to feeling ashamed because of having done something shameful, while yet this must have been preceded by some earlier episode of felt shame, presumably precipitated by some lesser (and less agency-filled) prior episode of doing something shameful, and on backwards into the unintelligible.
And I have not forgotten that I said that Adam and Eve are described either as having felt no shame, or as not having been shamed--when the King James insistence is on saying that Adam and Eve were not "ashamed." Here we are confronted, to state it in simplest terms, with the intrinsic interplay of sublime quality and ridiculousness that must attend any creation-story. We will always think of the beginning of our world as something coming from nothing, no matter how any story of the start of our world might be attended by contrary echoes. "In the beginning" starts Genesis, and then the narration does not start from the beginning. Even the inescapable packaging of a narrative into words can break up its flow, and obscure its indecipherable (to us) gradations.
If sin (and therefore, with sin, the damnable implications of guilt) is the fulcrum of humanity's discomfiture in the Genesis account, why mention "shame" at all? What is it to the narrative, to describe a lack of shame to a man being naked before his wife (or, by less definitive extension, before a God who had not proscribed nakedness), when nakedness was not a moral failing? What is it to the narrative, to describe a lack of shame in a sinless person, if such simply-described sinlessness is present?
Standing "sinless" and naked in the Garden in the morning of that fateful day was a woman who could carry on a conversation with a snake, a conversation in which she failed shamefully to stop her ears and flee when first hearing "Ye shall not surely die." Standing "sinful" and naked in the Garden in the evening of that fateful day was a man whose first response to his God's accusation was to place implicit blame on Eve (and, by extension, on God himself) by describing her as "the woman whom thou gavest to be with me." Are we to imagine an Adam in all those blessed preceding days as being perfectly disposed to turn his gaze from Eve in an instant of divinely-immeasurable brevity, when beckoned by his Maker?
If Adam and Eve were never shamed or made to feel shame in their "sinless" state, then they were preserved so by an artifice of God, an artifice yet to be elucidated by the preachers. Adam and Eve, before the Fall, are held by the denominations to have been successful in resisting temptation. If they wrestled with a temptation for any experienceable instant, then either they threw themselves against their own latent though unprevailing shameful tendencies, or they were as godlings, as alien to us as any pagan idol, and as unimaginable to us as any blessed angel.
As I said above, only the consideration of some observer, some appreciator, as being imperfect makes the notions of truth or meaning of moral import, since the qualities of morality or immorality hinge upon the relative attentions or efforts of the observer-appreciator. Next I will attempt to show how a proper understanding of morality must entail an organic interplay between shame and guilt.